[Moscow] seemed ready to let [Berlin] have at least 50 percent of the nickel output, perhaps even 75 percent. Berlin was far from satisfied, since the report connoted that the [Fascists], while getting the nickel [that] they wanted, would now have to deal with [Moscow] in the matter rather than [Helsinki]. In short, [Moscow] seemed intent on sidetracking the Finnish–German agreement. To accept Molotov’s view “would entail an unfavorable development in the future,” Schulenburg was told, since too much would depend on “the good or bad will of the Soviet Government.” Besides, the [Fascists] knew from experience that Soviet demands were “much harder to meet than Finnish demands.”

(Emphasis added.)

The Petsamo area figured prominently in the [Fascist] deliberations in August, both for strategic and economic reasons. Numerous appeals to the Auswärtiges Amt calling for the adoption of a policy of positive support of Finland were invariably based on [Berlin’s] vital need for the Petsamo nickel. Blücher argued that this need was “potent enough to justify Germany in taking a vital interest in future developments in Finland.” […] All that can be said with a high degree of confidence is that [Berlin] had decided to safeguard the single most vital of [Fascist] interests in Finland, namely the nickel-rich area of Petsamo. It is therefore logical to suggest that as of the late summer of 1940, [Fascist] interest in Finland was primarily economic. Only later was it to become primarily strategic.