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Cake day: 2023年8月4日

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  • I made the post you responded to before he edited his post to say “The war on drugs is a load of bullshit.” I wasn’t asking about that bit. And I agree with that bit.

    I was asking “how so?” about his statement that “this is actually good news.”

    But I don’t really see how this pardon is any move to weaken or end the war on drugs.

    When I have more time, I might see about responding to OP’s “sigh” post in this thread with more.






  • I wasn’t saying anything about who bears “fault”. My aim with that post (and honestly all the posts I’ve made in this thread) was about understanding the details of the vulnerability well enough for folks to be able to ascertain a) whether they’re affected and b) how to remediate.

    About “fault”, I’m not sure I really agree that’s the best way to talk about these things in general unless they did them purposefully. (WEI, for instance, was malicious bullshit. But I don’t have any particular reason to think in this specific situation Microsoft didn’t handle responsible disclosure properly or anything.)

    Clearly Microsoft made a boo boo in choosing to trust the vulnerable tools in the first place, but vulnerabilities are inevitable.

    I’ll definitely say I don’t consider Microsoft “trustworthy” enough to protect my stuff. If only because Microsoft stuff is bloated and has a huge amount of attack surface. But also because their history make it clear they’ll perpetrate really shitty things against their users on purpose. The former could only really be addressed by them slimming down their technology stack. The latter by abolishing the profit motive.

    And also, in general UEFI is apparently a cluster fuck of poor, buggy implementations. So there’s that.

    In all, this is one doesn’t strike me as terribly high on the “blameworthy” meter unless you just consider it a symptom of Microsoft being assholes, which is undeniably true.


  • I don’t know where you got the idea that the key fob doesn’t transmit a signal when at rest. If you’re talking about keyless ignition with the button on the car (not remote start via key fob) the key fob transmits a response when it gets a request from the car.

    The bad guys have a clever trick, though. They put one guy in your car and one guy next to you. The guy at the car hits the ignition button transmits the signal to the other guy, who transmits it to your fob. The second guy then transmits the response from your fob back to the guy in the car, who then sends it to the car. As far as your car knows, the fob is in the car. So it starts. A Faraday cage can protect against this.












  • They don’t even have to be signed…

    Yeah. My understanding is that Microsoft has signed several tools made by other companies that boot as UEFI PE executables and aren’t supposed to allow loading arbitrary (including unsigned and malicious) UEFI PE binaries, but due to security vulnerabilities in the tool, they’ll load any old UEFI PE binary you give them.

    The payload/malicious UEFI PE binaries don’t have to be signed. But the third-party tools that contain the vulnerabilities have to be signed by a signer your UEFI firmware trusts. (And the tools are signed by Microsoft, which your UEFI firmware almost definitely trusts, unless you’ve already applied a fix).

    (And I don’t know exactly what sort of tools they are. Maybe they’re like UEFI Shell software or something? Not sure. Not sure it matters that much for purposes of understanding the impact or remediation strategy for this vulnerability.)

    The fix, I’d imagine is:

    • Everyone should untrust the certificates used to sign those vulnerable tools. (And by “untrust”, I really mean they need to apply the revocations.)
    • Microsoft needs to issue new certificates to replace the ones with which they signed the vulnerable tools.
    • The companies who made those tools need to release new, fixed, not-vulnerable versions of the same tools.
    • …and get Microsoft to sign those new versions with the replacement keys.
    • And users need to migrate from the vulnerable versions to the new versions of the tools in question.

    Now, I’m not 100% sure if there needs to be yet another step in there where individual users explicitly install/trust the replacement certs. Those replacement certs are signed by Microsoft’s root certificate, right? As long as all the certificates in the chain from the root certifcate down to the signature are included with the UEFI PE binary, the firmware should be able to verify the new binary? Or maybe having chains of certs is not how UEFI PE binaries work. Not sure.

    Here is an example of something similar that disables Windows Platform Binary Table…(I’m not advocating that anybody actually use this).

    Yuck. Thanks for letting me know of that. I’m still firmly in the “learning” phase when it comes to this UEFI stuff. It’s good to be aware of this.