• kornel@lemmyrs.org
    link
    fedilink
    English
    arrow-up
    3
    ·
    1 year ago

    To generate the LLVM code correctly you need to run build.rs if there is any, and run proc macros which are natively compiled compiler plugins, currently running without any sandbox.

    The final code isn’t run, but the build process of Cargo crates can involve running of arbitrary code.

    The compilation process can be sandboxed as a whole, but if it runs arbitrary code, a malicious crate could take over the build process and falsify the LLVM output.

    • RunAwayFrog@sh.itjust.works
      link
      fedilink
      English
      arrow-up
      1
      ·
      1 year ago

      Hello kornel.

      Assuming you have the data, do you mind sharing how many crates in their latest version use compiler plugins?

    • BB_C
      link
      fedilink
      arrow-up
      1
      ·
      edit-2
      1 year ago

      Hello there. Now I feel uncomfortable. Who am I to talk in the presence of experts.

      To generate the LLVM code correctly you need to run build.rs if there is any

      Good point.

      and run proc macros which are natively compiled compiler plugins

      Hmm. When I read “Given the existence of macros”, I didn’t really think of compiler plugins. If that’s what was meant, then I apologize for what looks now like an ELI5 comment.

      The compilation process can be sandboxed as a whole, but if it runs arbitrary code, a malicious crate could take over the build process and falsify the LLVM output.

      Given that crater not only builds crates, but also runs tests, one would hope that such things wouldn’t sneak to painter unnoticed!

      • gedhrel@lemmy.ml
        link
        fedilink
        arrow-up
        1
        ·
        edit-2
        1 year ago

        Apology appreciated, but unnecessary.

        I don’t want to derail a useful tool. It’s worth going a bit beyond “hope” as a strategy, however, and thinking about if (how) this might be exploited.

        I doubt anyone will be mining crypto in your sandbox. But perhaps you should think about detection; might it be possible to mask a malicious crate with a second that attempts to detect sandboxed compilation, for instance?

        In any case, I think this still looks exceedingly interesting in the typical case, which is of detecting the impact of bugs from non-malicious actors.

        • gedhrel@lemmy.ml
          link
          fedilink
          arrow-up
          1
          ·
          1 year ago

          Given the widespread existence of wasm sandboxing, rustc itself might want to think about alternative strategies for running compiler plugins. I suspect there’d be a performance hit with such an approach, but wasm tooling is getting really good; perhaps it is minor.