Good news though. Israel can avoid a war if it wants. All it has to do is stop waging its current war.

Some of this article is just summarizing the current situation, which I don’t think is all that interesting.

But it does have discussion on an important perspective that I hadn’t considered or read much about.

Right now, there’s a lot of focus on the response to Iran’s October 1st ballistic missile attack. We’ve talked about what Israel is likely to do, what the US supports or does not, and so forth. Most of what I’ve read focuses on one of three potential targets:

• IRGC facilities

• Iran’s oil infrastructure

• Iran’s nuclear weapons facilities

I also recall reading one (early) article that cited an anonymous US official saying that they were hoping to convince Israel to hit Iranian-linked targets outside Iran, that that might be sufficient to satisfy Israel. I haven’t seen more discussion on that. Looking closely at what each party has said, that’d permit Israel to damage a bunch of things that Iran values, but also permit Iran to say that Israel hasn’t crossed the line that the IRGC drew in Bagheri’s statement when he threatened a larger ballistic missile attack in response to any Israeli attack on Iranian territory.

But…assuming continued escalation, that’s not the end of things. I’ve read a few articles talking about what the end game between Israel and Hezbollah is, but not longer-term Iran-Israel.

The author is a nuclear weapons specialist focusing on the Middle East. His perspective is more “where does this go if Israel hits Iran, and then Iran hits Israel back again harder”.

He stated that he didn’t presently believe that Israel would likely hit Iran’s nuclear weapons facilities in this strike.

What’s on the table? Israel may target military installations, such as surface-to-surface missile bases or anti-aircraft systems, or Iran’s energy sector and political regime symbols. An attack on Iran’s nuclear facilities is being debated in Israel, but is not likely at the moment.

Factors being considered include the operational capability to execute such a strike effectively, the time that would be required to rebuild the facilities, expected regional reactions and the impact on Iran’s future decision to develop nuclear weapons. Additionally, the Biden administration’s opposition to attacking the nuclear sites is a consideration, particularly in view of the upcoming presidential election.

However, he also looks down the line of an escalation spiral – if Israel hits Iran, then Iran conducts a large-scale ballistic strike against Israel in response – as Bagheri had threatened after the earlier attack – then the author believes that Israel hitting Iran’s nuclear weapons facilities becomes more-likely:

Recently, however, there has been a possible shift in the Israeli stance — evident, for instance, in a growing public discourse on the issue. The increased attention in Israel stems partly from the unprecedented advancement of the Iranian nuclear project, the overconfidence this gives Tehran and the intensifying internal Iranian calls to acquire nuclear weapons. An underlying cause for the shift is the absence of an international mechanism to control and monitor the program and the looming expiration of the “snapback” mechanism in October 2025, which would hinder a quick reinstatement of U.N. Security Council sanctions against Iran.

The significant weakening of Hezbollah and the reduced risk it poses to Israel in a future confrontation with Iran, coupled with the high costs Israel is already bearing in its fight against the “axis of resistance,” might be viewed by Israeli decision-makers as an opportunity to act. The trauma of Oct. 7 and the public’s increasing support for more aggressive responses against external attacks intensify belligerent Israeli sentiments towards Iran.

All eyes are now on Israel. Its response is likely to follow a military-regional logic aimed at preventing further direct attacks from Iran and isolating the various fronts of conflict. However, continued intense confrontations between the two countries, along with escalating attacks on Hezbollah, could further amplify the discourse in Tehran favoring a nuclear breakout and increase support in Jerusalem for striking the nuclear facilities. This would create a dangerous self-perpetuating cycle.

The history of the Middle East and beyond is being shaped right now. In the years to come, scholars will explore the crucial decisions facing leaders in Jerusalem, Tehran, Washington and elsewhere that today may seem like just another news update.

Like, in looking at the situation, it’s worth considering actions both in the light of the action themselves, and where they’ll wind up, after multiple iterations of the responses involved.

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