• DeanFogg
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    1 year ago

    You act like it’s impossible which really comes off as desperation for it to be true. Definitely not impossible

    If they could access those indiscriminately you could guaran-fucking-tee people would start taking it seriously.

    /tinfoil hat

    That’s why they don’t list those things in your app permissions unless it expressly “uses it”

    Zuckerborg probably watches people pee all the time.

    • varzaman
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      1 year ago

      It’s not imposibile, it’s unlikely, and would be noticeable.

      Dunno how app permissions prove that they are always listening when those permissions are required to access the mic at any point in time, including when you’re using the app and invoke it yourself.

      • DeanFogg
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        1 year ago

        When you build the back door you can keep your own key

        • varzaman
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          1 year ago

          Show me evidence that Apple has a backdoor for companies like Meta, that circumvent their normal iOS functionality.

            • varzaman
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              1 year ago

              None of this is what I was looking for.

              Meta is plugging in USBs or connecting to people’s accounts en masse to get into people’s encrypted backups? I think not.

              People keep claiming Meta does this, does that when it comes to microphones. Where is the proof? I haven’t seen a SINGLE piece of evidence to show that Meta is listening to you at all times when you aren’t using the app. I only ever see people’s anecdotes of “it heard me talk about something cause it popped up later”.

              I mean look at the dependencies from your article.

              The Attacker first need to grab the pairing keys The targeted iOS device should be physically near to the attacker Targeted iPhone needs to have its Wi-Fi switched ON The Attacker and targeted iOS device should be in the same Wi-Fi network Targeted device should not been rebooted since the last time the user entered the PIN

              You think Meta is doing this to everyone’s devices? That isn’t even feasible lol.