cultural reviewer and dabbler in stylistic premonitions

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Joined 3 years ago
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Cake day: January 17th, 2022

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  • Regarding your browser-based thing: what are the specific capabilities of the “threat agents” (in your threat model’s terminology) which your e2ee is intended to protect against?

    It seems like the e2ee is not needed against an attacker who (a) cannot circumvent HTTPS and (b) cannot compromise the server; HTTPS and an honest server will prevent them from seeing plaintext. But, if an attacker can do one of those things, does your e2ee actually stop them?

    The purpose of e2ee is to protect against a malicious server, but, re-fetching JavaScript from the server each time they use the thing means that users must actually rely on the server’s honesty (and HTTPS) completely. There is no way (in a normal web browser) for users to verify that the JavaScript they’re executing is the correct JavaScript.

    If you run a browser-based e2ee service like this and it becomes popular, you should be prepared that somebody might eventually try to compel you to serve malicious JavaScript to specific users. Search “lavabit” or “hushmail” for some well-documented cases where this has happened.




  • Arthur Besse@lemmy.mltolinuxmemes@lemmy.worldLinux "Anti"-Piracy Screen
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    1 day ago

    What a confused image.

    1. TiVo complied with the GPLv2 and distributed source code for their modifications to Linux. What they did not do was distribute the cryptographic keys which would allow TiVo customers to run modified versions it on their TiVo devices. This is what motivated the so-called anti-tivoization clause in GPLv3 (the “Installation Information” part of Section 6. Conveying Non-Source Forms.).
    2. Linux remains GPLv2, so, everyone today still has the right to do the same thing TiVo did (shipping it in a product with a locked bootloader).
    3. Distributing Linux (or any GPLv2 software) with a threat of violence against recipients who exercise some of the rights granted by the license, as is depicted in this post, would be a violation section 6 of GPLv2 (“You may not impose any further restrictions on the recipients’ exercise of the rights granted herein.”).



  • They only do that if you are a threat.

    Lmao. Even CBP does not claim that. On the contrary, they say (and courts have so far agreed) that they can perform these types of border searches without any probable cause, and even without reasonable suspicion (a weaker legal standard than probable cause).

    In practice they routinely do it to people who are friends with someone (or recently interacted with someone on social media) who they think could be a threat, as well as to people who have a name similar to someone else they’re interested in for whatever reason, or if the CBP officer just feels like it - often because of what the person looks like.

    It’s nice for you that you feel confident that you won’t be subjected to this kind of thing, but you shouldn’t assume OP and other people don’t need to be prepared for it.













  • Why Can’t Robots Check “I’m Not A Robot”?

    They actually can: https://nopecha.com/ is one of several services which apparently reliably solves them automatically. They give you 100/day for free, and if you need more it’s just $1 for 60000 - two orders of magnitude cheaper than the human-powered captcha farms which have been in business since captchas became popular. Captchas don’t stop bots, they just keep out the amateurs.

    (I haven’t tried this service and certainly don’t endorse it; I notice their website uses cloudflare and fully blocks Tor - no captcha is even offered 🤡)





  • Arthur Besse@lemmy.mltoPrivacy@lemmy.mlPro Tip: Global eSims
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    14 days ago

    It seems to me that switching SIMs provides little privacy benefit, because carriers, data brokers, and the adversaries of privacy-desiring people whom they share data with are obviously able to correlate IMEIs (phones) with IMSIs (SIMs).

    What kind of specific privacy threats do you think are mitigated by using different SIMs in the same phone (especially the common practice of using an “anonymous” SIM in a phone where you’ve previously used a SIM linked to your name)?